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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
AMP Incorporated brought suit under the Pennsylvania 
Business Corporation Law ("PBCL"), 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 2501 et seq. (West 1995), alleging that 20,000,100 
shares of AMP stock acquired by AlliedSignal, Inc., 
amounting to 9.1% of outstanding AMP stock, are control 
shares within the meaning of the portion of the PBCL 
commonly known as the Control Share Acquisitions 
Statute, 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. SS 2561-68 (the "Statute"). 
AMP charged that because of a voting disqualification in the 
Statute, AlliedSignal could not vote those shares. The 
district court, construing the Statute, concluded that, 
although AlliedSignal's acquisition totaled less than 20% of 
the outstanding AMP stock, the numerical threshold for the 
voting disqualification, the Statute requires that shares 
bought with the intent to make a "control share 
acquisition" as defined by the Statute are"control shares," 
and so lose voting rights unless restored as provided in the 
Statute. Therefore, the court enjoined AlliedSignal from 
voting its shares. AlliedSignal and its subsidiary used in 
acquiring AMP shares, PMA Acquisition Corporation, 
appeal. We conclude that there must be a "control-share 
acquisition" triggered upon actual acquisition of at least 
20% of the outstanding shares by an acquiring person 
before voting shares may be deemed "control shares." 
Consequently, we will reverse. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
AMP is a Pennsylvania corporation which designs, 
manufactures and, on a worldwide basis, markets 
electronic, electrical and electro-optic connection devices, 
interconnection systems and connector assemblies. Its 
principal place of business is in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 
and it is a registered corporation within the meaning of 
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section 2502 of the PBCL, 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.S 2501 
et seq. Allied Signal is a Delaware corporation with its 
principal place of business in Morristown, New Jersey, and 
is the beneficial owner of 20,000,100 AMP shares, or 9.1% 
of AMP's outstanding stock, having bought those shares 
intending to acquire AMP. Allied Signal is an advanced 
technology and manufacturing company with worldwide 
operations in the aerospace, automotive and engineered 
materials businesses. 
 
In August 1998, Allied Signal began to make overtures to 
AMP for a negotiated merger transaction. On August 4, 
1998, Allied Signal announced that it would commence an 
unsolicited tender offer for all of the outstanding shares of 
the common stock of AMP and would seek to merge the two 
companies. On August 10, 1998, Allied Signal filed a tender 
offer statement on Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities 
Exchange Commission setting forth the terms of the tender 
offer and other information. 
 
On August 21, 1998, the AMP directors formally rejected 
AlliedSignal's offer, and filed a complaint in the district 
court against AlliedSignal and PMA Acquisition 
Corporation. While this appeal involves only state law 
issues, the overall action also includes federal issues, so 
that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331, 1332, and 1367. In light of AMP's opposition, 
AlliedSignal amended its offer to reduce the number of 
shares it sought to 40,000,000, the approximate number it 
could acquire without triggering AMP's then-existing 
"poison pill." On September 21, 1998, after AMP's board 
reduced the share ownership threshold for triggering the 
"poison pill" from 20% to 10%, AlliedSignal amended its 
offer again to reduce the number of shares sought, this 
time to 20,000,000, or approximately 9.1% of all AMP 
shares outstanding. The next day AMP amended its 
complaint to add, among other charges, Count Four, the 
subject of this appeal. 
 
In Count Four AMP alleged that the shares which 
AlliedSignal proposed to buy pursuant to the amended 
tender offer are "control shares" because AlliedSignal had 
announced its offer to purchase all AMP shares. Thus, AMP 
argued that in view of the statutory voting disqualification, 
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AlliedSignal could not vote the shares it proposed to buy. 
On October 9, 1998, after the expiration of its amended 
tender offer, AlliedSignal purchased 20,000,000 shares of 
AMP stock at a cost of $890 million. Because AlliedSignal 
earlier had purchased 100 shares of AMP stock, 
AlliedSignal was and is now the beneficial owner of 
20,000,100 shares of AMP stock or 9.1% of AMP's 
outstanding shares.1 
 
On October 15, 1998, AMP moved for partial summary 
judgment on Count Four of its first Amended Complaint. In 
particular, it sought a declaratory judgment that 
AlliedSignal's shares in AMP are "control shares" as defined 
by the Control Share Acquisitions Statute and an 
injunction barring AlliedSignal from voting any AMP shares 
unless and until AlliedSignal obtains a restoration of its 
voting rights in accordance with the Statute. AlliedSignal 
cross-moved on October 29, 1998, for partial summary 
judgment against AMP dismissing Count Four on the 
grounds that the shares it had acquired were not"control 
shares" and that their acquisition thus had not triggered a 
loss of voting rights. A hearing was held on November 4, 
1998, and on November 18, 1998, the district court issued 
a Memorandum Opinion and Order granting AMP's motion 
for partial summary judgment on Count Four and denying 
AlliedSignal's cross-motion. Thus, AlliedSignal, AMP's 
largest shareholder, cannot vote its shares of AMP with 
respect to the consent solicitation as well as any issues 
voted upon at the annual 1999 shareholders meeting, 
including a potential merger between AMP and Tyco 
International, Ltd., announced by AMP on November 22, 
1998. AlliedSignal and PMA Acquisition Corporationfiled 
their notice of appeal on November 23, 1998. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1292(a)(1) and, because we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The parties agreed at the oral argument before us that AlliedSignal is 
the beneficial owner of all of those shares, contrary to the discussion in 
the district court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, which stated that 
"[b]eneficially owned shares . . . carry a rebuttable presumption that 
they 
are control shares," while "[t]here is no such rebuttable presumption . . 
. 
covering the voting shares actually owned . . . ." We believe that the 
district court's reading of beneficial ownership was incorrect as such 
ownership clearly includes outright ownership. 
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decide this case through the application of legal principles, 
we exercise plenary review. See AT&T Co. v. Winback and 
Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994). 
In this regard, we point out that the district court did not 
suggest that it predicated the injunction on any basis other 
than its construction of the Statute. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
Pennsylvania's 1990 Control Share Acquisitions Statute, 
Chapter 25, Subchapter G of the PBCL, 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. SS 2561-68, requires that tender offers be subject to 
shareholder approval at a meeting. This complex statute 
was one of many similar state laws passed beginning in the 
1980s to protect businesses from certain abusive and 
manipulative practices of corporate raiders. See S. Wallman 
and L. Gordon, Pennsylvania's Anti-Raider Legislation, 4 
No. 8 Insights 38 (Aug. 1990). 
 
The Statute treats a person's acquiring voting power over 
20% of the voting shares of a corporation as a fundamental 
corporate transaction requiring prior shareholder approval. 
Specifically, while not limiting a purchaser from acquiring 
shares, the Statute provides that "control shares" may not 
be voted until the shareholders grant approval. Control 
shares are defined as voting shares providing a person with 
voting power in three specified ranges, beginning with 20%. 
Control shares also include shares owned by an acquiring 
person purchased with the intent of making a control-share 
acquisition or purchased within 180 days prior to that 
person's making a control-share acquisition. 
 
We think that the clearest reading of this rather 
confusingly-drafted statute is that an "acquiring person" 
loses its right to vote its shares when it actually acquires 
enough shares to bring its total shares beneficially owned 
to or above one of the statutory thresholds of voting power, 
starting at 20%. The parties agree that AlliedSignal is an 
"acquiring person" as defined by the statute: a "person who 
makes or proposes to make a control-share acquisition." 15 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2562. 
 
A "control-share acquisition" is defined in section 2562 
as 
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       An acquisition . . . that, but for this subchapter, would, 
       when added to all voting power of the person over other 
       voting shares of the corporation . . . entitle the person 
       to cast . . . [votes in these ranges]: (1) at least 20% but 
       less than 33 1/3%, (2) at least 33 1/3% but less than 
       50%, or (3) 50% or more. 
 
AMP concedes that under the statutory definition there has 
not been a "control-share acquisition" in the sense of 
AlliedSignal's reaching a statutory threshold for it has not 
acquired 20% of AMP's shares. Br. at 10. However, in effect, 
AMP is arguing that the definition of "control shares" 
operates such that an "acquiring person" can have its 
"control shares" stripped of voting power without having 
made an actual "control-share acquisition." 
 
The appeal largely boils down to how "control shares" is 
defined in section 2562. The two-sentence provision defines 
"control shares" as: 
 
       Those voting shares of a corporation that, upon 
       acquisition of voting power over such shares by an 
       acquiring person, would result in a control-share 
       acquisition. Voting shares beneficially owned by an 
       acquiring person shall also be deemed to be control 
       shares where such beneficial ownership was acquired 
       by the acquiring person: 
 
       (1) within 180 days of the day the person makes a 
       control-share acquisition; or 
 
       (2) with the intention of making a control-share 
       acquisition. 
 
15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2562 (emphasis added). 
 
The trouble lies in subsection (2) of the second sentence, 
which the district court held to mean that if an acquiring 
person has bought shares with the express intention of 
buying more shares to make a control-share acquisition, 
those shares already acquired are "control shares." But the 
use of the past tense in the second sentence --"was 
acquired . . . . with the intention" -- and the use of the 
word "deemed," suggest that the subsection looks backward 
in time, so as to be applied to those shares an acquiring 
person buys which, when added to those it already 
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purchased, bring its beneficial ownership to the 20% 
threshold. The previously-acquired shares would be 
"deemed" retroactively to be "control shares" and covered 
under subsection (2), when, as here, they were "acquired 
. . . with the intention of making a control-share 
acquisition." Thus, when the acquiring person's holdings 
actually reach the 20% threshold, all of the stock it has 
acquired, even that acquired before it reached the 
threshold, is deemed "control share" stock, since, under the 
first sentence of the definition, the acquiring person now 
has made a "control-share acquisition." The inclusion of the 
second sentence shows that those last shares which one 
buys to reach the 20% threshold are not the only ones that 
are "control shares" subject to the voting disqualification; 
rather, all those shares purchased within the previous 180 
days and those bought at any time in the past with intent 
to make a "control-share acquisition" are subject to the 
disqualification. 
 
In this regard, we point out that the Control Share 
Acquisitions Statute is set forth in a subchapter in the 
PBCL entitled "Control-Share Acquisitions": our conclusion 
reconciles the statutory definition of "control-share 
acquisition," which sets forth the three acquisition 
thresholds, with the rather complicated definition of 
"control shares." The district court's construction of 
"control shares" is difficult to harmonize with the 20%, 
33 1/3% and 50% acquisition triggers, since under its view 
intent alone could create control shares where there is no 
actual control-share acquisition or where the acquiring 
person has accumulated only a small number of shares in 
the company to be acquired. We recognize, of course, that 
the definition of "acquiring person" includes a person who 
"proposes to make" a control-share acquisition. 15 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. S 2562. The district court used this 
definition as evidence that shares one buys with intent to 
make a later control-share acquisition are control shares. 
Nevertheless, we believe that the critical issue is how to 
reconcile the definitions of "control shares" and "control- 
share acquisition." Our definition of "control shares" 
accords with the definition of "acquiring person" in that 
AlliedSignal, which does intend to make a control-share 
acquisition in the future, may be an "acquiring person" 
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without its shares being stripped of voting rights when 
numerically they do not even approach the 20% threshold. 
 
Applicable legislative history is sparse, but we believe 
that the evidence suggests that the Statute was intended to 
"kick in" once an actual threshold has been reached. The 
Draftsmen's Comment states that the term "control-share 
acquisition" 
 
       utilizes the concept of voting power in three specified 
       ranges, beginning with 20%. . . . In many instances a 
       much lower percentage could be utilized as the 
       percentage at which control could be affected, but for 
       purposes of the subchapter and its general 
       applicability to corporations the 20% threshold was 
       selected. 
 
Draftsmen's Comment to S 2562, at 477, 2 Zeiter, 
Pennsylvania Associations Code and Related Materials  
(West 1992). We believe that the whole Statute must 
operate with the definition of "control-share acquisition" 
and its specified thresholds kept in mind. The various 
provisions and definitions must be read together in 
harmony. 
 
Furthermore, it seems clear that Pennsylvania's Statute, 
like those of other states, was modeled upon Indiana's, 
which is triggered by actual share acquisitions of 20% of 
outstanding stock. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann.S 23-1-42-1; 
N.C. Gen. Stat. S 55-9A-01; Neb. Rev. Stat.S 21-2439.2 The 
Draftsmen's Comment to section 2562 shows that the 
Draftsmen did have the anti-raider laws of other states in 
mind ("the 20% threshold is within the range of levels set 
in similar statutes in other states.").3 
 
AMP admits that under Indiana's law, AlliedSignal would 
prevail. Br. at 29. Indiana explicitly covers those shares 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Under Pennsylvania law, we may consider similar statutes of other 
jurisdictions in construing the Statute. General Elec. Envtl. Serv., Inc. 
v. 
Envirotech Corp., 763 F. Supp. 113, 118-19 (M.D. Pa. 1991). 
 
3. See also April 23, 1990 Pennsylvania Senate Journal at 1947 
(Comments of Senator Wenger) (statute bars "a raider who acquires more 
than 20 percent of a company from voting [its] shares to change 
corporate control without the approval of the remaining shareholders"). 
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which -- "added to all other shares" -- reach the 20% 
threshold "immediately after" they are bought. Ind. Code 
Ann. S 23-1-42-1 (quoted below). AMP has not offered any 
indication that the Pennsylvania legislators intended a 
departure from the norm of Indiana and other states, which 
require reaching an actual threshold before voting shares 
are disenfranchised. AMP argues that the Pennsylvania 
statute was intended to be different from the Indiana 
statute because the definitions of "control share" differ. Br. 
at 29. AMP focuses upon the fact that the Indiana statute's 
definition of "control shares" stops without a second 
sentence comparable to that in Pennsylvania's Statute. 
"Control shares" are defined in Indiana as: 
 
       shares that, except for this chapter, would have voting 
       power with respect to shares of an issuing public 
       corporation that, when added to all other shares of the 
       issuing public corporation owned by a person or in 
       respect to which that person may exercise or direct the 
       exercise of voting power, would entitle that person, 
       immediately after acquisition of the shares (directly or 
       indirectly, alone or as a part of a group), to exercise or 
       direct the exercise of the voting power of the issuing 
       public corporation in the election of directors within 
       any of the following ranges of voting power: 
 
       (1) One-fifth (1/5) or more but less than one-third (1/3) 
       of all voting power. 
 
       (2) One-third (1/3) or more but less than a majority of 
       all voting power. 
 
       (3) A majority or more of all voting power. 
 
Ind. Code Ann. S 23-1-42-1. 
 
Inasmuch as AMP recognizes that under the Indiana 
statute, AlliedSignal's stock would not be control shares, 
AMP's argument hinges upon the Pennsylvania statute's 
inclusion of subsection (2) of the second sentence of the 
definition of "control shares": AMP argues that this 
language differs enough from that in statutes in other 
states to demonstrate that the Pennsylvania legislature 
intended it to operate differently in Pennsylvania. However, 
the Indiana statute's definition of "control share 
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acquisition" contains language resembling Pennsylvania 
statute's definition of "control shares," for it covers shares 
bought within a certain time frame as well as previously- 
bought shares acquired with the intention to reach a 
threshold. Ind. Code Ann. S 23-1-42-2(b). The Indiana 
definition of "control share acquisition" provides that, for 
purposes of the disenfranchisement provision, "shares 
acquired within ninety (90) days or shares acquired 
pursuant to a plan to make a control share acquisition are 
considered to have been acquired in the same acquisition." 
Id. See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 
U.S. 69, 74, 107 S.Ct. 1637, 1641 (1987) (explaining 
operation of Indiana control share acquisitions statute). 
 
Finally, as construed by the district court, the Statute 
provides no way for a beneficial owner stripped of voting 
power but not yet having met one of the thresholds 
specified in the definition of "control-share acquisition" to 
regain voting rights. Here, for example, under the district 
court's opinion, AlliedSignal has become the owner of 
"control shares" but has not made a "control-share 
acquisition." Under the Statute, a special meeting to restore 
voting rights will be called if the acquiring person"makes a 
control-share acquisition or a bona fide written offer to 
make a control-share acquisition," 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 2565(a)(3), "files an information statement fully 
conforming to section 2566," id. S 2565(a)(1), and has 
"entered into a definitive financing agreement to provide for 
any amounts of financing of the control-share acquisition 
not to be provided" by it. Id. S 2565(d)(2)(i). The acquirer 
then has 90 days after restoration of voting rights to 
consummate the control-share acquisition or those rights 
lapse. Id. S 2564(b). Where, as here, there is no outstanding 
bona fide written offer, information statement andfinancing 
arrangement to make a control-share acquisition, i.e., to 
reach the 20% threshold, section 2565(a) does not provide 
a clear process through which voting rights can be 
reinstated by other shareholders. 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
S 2565(a).4 Moreover, an acquiring person who buys shares 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. AMP responds that AlliedSignal previously has made a written offer, 
br. at 26, but it is not clear that the existence of such a prior offer, 
especially without an information statement and financing 
arrangements, will enable AlliedSignal to request the special meeting. 
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gradually -- however few at any one time -- would have to 
continue to petition to have its voting rights restored, 
unless it chose to accelerate the process by consummating 
the acquisition within 90 days: such a result is impractical, 
as well as having the undesired effect of hastening tender 
offers rather than delaying them. 
 
A reading contrary to ours, in addition to creating the 
unreasonable results identified above, would burden the 
market for corporate control substantially and would 
entrench management in a manner likely to harm the long- 
term interests of shareholders. These undesirable 
consequences provide further support for our interpretation 
of the Statute. First, while under AMP's reading it still 
would be possible for a bidder such as Allied Signal to 
solicit proxies to gain control of the target, as a practical 
matter, the expense and unlikelihood of winning a proxy 
contest without an appreciable number of votes committed 
to the solicitor's position effectively eliminates this type of 
challenge to the control of management. Second, AMP's 
reading almost certainly would eliminate the practice of 
buying a sizeable stake of the company (say 6%) and 
threatening a control contest to prod management toward 
better corporate policy.5 This practice would be eliminated 
as a practical matter because the shares would lose their 
voting rights upon acquisition and any credible threat to 
control would be neutralized. Finally, it is difficult to 
reconcile AMP's interpretation of the Statute with the 
prevailing rule regarding the propriety of corporate 
defensive tactics -- viz., that the defensive measure must 
be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. See Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
We believe that a defensive measure that disenfranchises 
even a single share acquired with an intent to contest 
control of the company would not pass this test of 
proportionality. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. See Steven Bailey and Steven Syre,"Playing Tough Guy to Get the 
Deals Done: Value Investor Michael Price Shows No Doubt in Using 
Clout," Boston Globe, June 26, 1997, at C1 (describing Price's use of this 
tactic in merger between Chase Manhattan Corp. and Chemical Banking 
Corp.). 
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Thus, AlliedSignal's interpretation of the Statute can be 
reconciled with the statutory language and avoids the 
unreasonable results that AMP's interpretation would 
produce -- results that we cannot believe the Pennsylvania 
Legislature intended. Lehigh Valley Coop. Farmers v. 
Commonwealth of Pa., 447 A.2d 948, 950-51 (Pa. 1982) (in 
construing statute, court may presume that General 
Assembly did not intend absurd or unreasonable result). If 
we were to affirm we, in effect, would be holding that 
Pennsylvania's takeover law departs from that of all other 
states' takeover laws and that the Pennsylvania Legislature 
effected this radical departure without providing any clear 
evidence that it meant to do so. Moreover, it would be 
difficult to reconcile that construction of the Statute with 
the available procedure to restore the lost voting rights of 
control shares in situations -- including the present case -- 
in which an acquirer gradually purchases stock as it moves 
towards the 20% threshold. 
 
It is true that a purchase of 19.99% of shares --or 17%, 
or, perhaps, 9.1% -- by an "acquiring person" may create 
the same sorts of corporate-control dilemmas for a 
company being acquired as would a purchase of 20% or 
20.01%. Still, the definition of "control-share acquisition" 
here, as elsewhere, clearly specifies a level of acquisition to 
be reached before a shareholder suffers the serious 
disability of losing voting rights. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We conclude that the Pennsylvania Control Share 
Acquisitions Statute requires an "acquiring person" to 
purchase shares such that its total ownership of 
outstanding shares amounts to or exceeds the level of 20% 
(or 33 1/3 or 50%, as the case may be), when those shares 
include previously-acquired shares bought with an intent to 
make a control-share acquisition or bought within 180 days 
before the disenfranchising effect of the Statute is triggered. 
We therefore will reverse the district court's order of 
November 18, 1998, granting the motion for partial 
summary judgment and enjoining AlliedSignal from voting 
its 20,000,010 shares of AMP stock, and will remand the 
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matter to the district court for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
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